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Treasure Islands

James R. Hines Jr.

I

n movies and novels, tax havens are often settings for shady international deals;
in practice, they are rather less flashy. Tax havens are countries and territories
that offer low tax rates and favorable regulatory policies to foreign investors.
For example, tax havens typically tax inbound investment at zero or very low rates
and further encourage investment with telecommunications and transportation
facilities, other business infrastructure, favorable legal environments, and limited
bureaucratic hurdles to starting new firms. Tax havens are small: most are islands;
all but a few have populations below one million; and they have above-average
incomes. Tax havens are also known as “offshore financial centers” or “international
financial centers,” phrases that may carry slightly differing connotations but nevertheless are used almost interchangeably with “tax havens.”
The definition of exactly what makes a tax haven may depend on the type
of investment and requires a degree of judgment, but fortunately, those who have
considered the issue keep compiling very similar lists. For example, in Hines and
Rice (1994), my coauthor and I identified tax havens based on their low business
tax rates, self-promotion as financial centers, and whether they were identified as
tax havens by other authoritative sources. OECD (2000) identified a similar list of
tax havens (though one that omits OECD countries), as did Diamond and Diamond
(2002) and the U.S. Government Accountability Office (2008). Table 1 offers a
rather inclusive list of 52 countries and territories commonly considered to be tax
havens. Taken together, they have a total population of about 50 million and a total
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Table 1
Tax Havens
Andorra
Anguilla
Antigua and Barbuda
Aruba
Bahamas
Bahrain
Barbados
Belize
Bermuda
British Virgin Islands
Cayman Islands
Cook Islands
Costa Rica
Cyprus
Djibouti
Dominica
Gibraltar
Grenada

Guernsey
Hong Kong
Ireland
Isle of Man
Jersey
Jordan
Lebanon
Liberia
Liechtenstein
Luxembourg
Macao
Maldives
Malta
Marshall Islands
Mauritius
Micronesia
Monaco
Montserrat

Nauru
Netherlands Antilles
Niue
Panama
Samoa
San Marino
Seychelles
Singapore
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Martin
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Switzerland
Tonga
Turks and Caicos Islands
Vanuatu

Note: See text for the selection method.

GDP of about $1.1 trillion—that is, roughly the size of the economy of New York
State. However, three-quarters of that GDP lies in four countries—Hong Kong,
Ireland, Singapore, and Switzerland—and 16 of these economies have national
GDPs of less than $2 billion.
The United States and other higher-tax countries frequently express concerns
over how tax havens may affect their economies. For example, tax havens might erode
domestic tax collections by permitting individuals to earn income through accounts
in tax havens that they do not disclose to their home governments, or else by facilitating a situation in which business income actually earned in high-tax jurisdictions is
reported for tax purposes as having been earned elsewhere. Tax havens could attract
economic activity that is arguably lost to higher-tax countries where the activity might
otherwise have located. Some worry that corporate and banking secrecy offered
by tax havens could facilitate criminal activities, including crimes by dictators, and
terrorist and drug-related activities. Confidential accounts in tax havens might reduce
the transparency of financial accounts and thereby impede the smooth operation
and regulation of legal and financial systems around the world. Finally, differences
between the policies of tax havens and those of other countries may contribute to the
problem, if it is one, of excessive international tax competition.
These concerns are all plausible, albeit often founded on anecdotal rather than
systematic evidence. They are buttressed by a sense, held by many, that there is
something distasteful in the kinds of financial transactions for which tax havens are
best known.
Yet tax haven policies may also benefit other economies and even facilitate the
effective operation of the tax systems of other countries. Tax havens change the
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nature of tax competition among other countries, very possibly permitting them to
sustain high domestic tax rates that are effectively mitigated for mobile international
investors whose transactions are routed through tax havens. By differentiating tax
burdens in this way, countries are able to maintain sizable domestic tax bases in the
face of growing international competition. The financial and other business activity
taking place in tax havens is likely to contribute to economic activity elsewhere,
since tax havens themselves are largely intermediaries, with rather small economic
sectors relative to their financial footprints. The presence of a nearby thriving tax
haven financial sector seems to increase the competitiveness of a country’s banking
sector. In fact, countries that lie close to tax havens have exhibited more rapid real
income growth than have those further away, possibly in part as a result of financial
flows and their market effects.
While historically tax havens were associated with corporate anonymity and
bank secrecy, initiatives by the OECD and other international coalitions have
prompted every country, including now all of the tax havens, to agree to information exchange for tax enforcement purposes. Furthermore, some intriguing
recent evidence (reported by Sharman in this issue) suggests that large wealthy
countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom may have become
locations of choice for those interested in establishing anonymous accounts. Tax
havens are far from being rogue dictatorships that sponsor international terrorism
and related activities; instead, tax havens typically score very highly in measures of
democratic governance.
This paper evaluates evidence of the economic effects of tax havens, starting
with the international investment flows associated with tax havens and the concerns
they raise. This is followed by analyzing the impact of tax havens on capital markets
and foreign direct investment, and the likely effect of tax havens on tax policies
elsewhere. The conclusion considers economic growth patterns associated with tax
havens and their implications for developing countries in particular.

Tax Havens and International Investment
By every measure, tax havens receive large capital flows from other countries.
Standard practice divides private international capital flows into direct and portfolio investment. Direct investment is the accumulation of ownership claims in a
foreign entity in which the investor has a controlling interest, almost always defined
as 10 percent or greater ownership shares. Hence, if an American multinational
firm invests $10 million of equity capital in its wholly-owned French subsidiary or
loans $10 million to the same subsidiary, this is recorded as $10 million of U.S.
direct investment in France. Portfolio capital flows reflect investments in which the
investor does not have a controlling interest as defined by the 10 percent criterion;
thus, if an American individual spends $1,000 to purchase stock in a publicly-held
German corporation, this represents $1,000 of portfolio investment from the
United States to Germany.
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Table 2
International Portfolio Investment, 2002 and 2007
Portfolio investment
2002
Country
United States
United Kingdom
Germany
France
Netherlands
Italy
Japan
Spain
Luxembourg
Cayman Islands
Ireland
Switzerland
Bermuda
Hong Kong
Jersey
Netherlands Antilles
Singapore
British Virgin Islands
Guernsey
Panama
Cyprus
Bahamas
Marshall Islands
Bahrain
Liberia
Isle of Man
Mauritius
32 other tax havens

2007

GDP
2006

In millions of dollars

Population
2006

3,284,387
1,368,065
1,359,512
846,926
824,709
737,610
509,922
335,783

7,347,223
3,649,266
3,213,623
2,411,138
1,687,390
1,543,029
1,467,298
1,355,310

12,738,526
1,887,495
2,513,585
1,850,544
550,650
1,651,612
3,892,954
1,223,615

298,442,420
60,609,153
82,422,299
63,292,515
16,491,461
58,133,509
127,515,169
40,397,842

648,876
534,553
240,389
230,987
138,916
68,929
47,364
70,026
42,265
24,499
16,628
13,731
1,877
13,851
484
32
2,805
194
640

2,133,046
1,827,291
1,234,862
665,090
515,387
341,900
320,968
223,143
170,916
86,915
78,933
40,136
28,166
27,424
14,151
10,146
8,546
6,764
6,401

35,280
2,415
164,008
274,697
3,130
281,730
5,100
3,141
184,854
1,107
2,742
27,355
18,882
8,306
436
18,377
1,127
2,942
23,809

474,413
46,663
4,062,235
7,523,934
66,436
6,940,432
91,812
223,016
4,492,150
24,150
65,632
3,206,481
784,301
303,770
60,451
698,585
3,043,979
75,715
1,253,425

7,926

20,283

171,246

17,792,778

Sources: For portfolio investment, the IMF (see ⟨http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/cpis.htm⟩); for
GDP and population, the Penn World Tables, version 6.3 (⟨http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/⟩), supplemented,
as needed, by information from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA, 2009).
Notes: The table presents year-end 2002 and 2007 portfolio investment levels in (for the top panel)
countries with at least $1 trillion of portfolio investment, and (for the bottom panel) tax havens with
at least $5 billion of portfolio investment in 2007. Information for “32 other tax havens” includes every
other country listed in Table 1, except St. Martin, for which data are unavailable.

Tax havens receive large gross flows of portfolio investment from other countries. Table 2 reports data from the IMF (described in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti,
2010, and available at ⟨http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/datarsl.htm
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/datarsl.htm⟩⟩) on
total stocks of inbound portfolio investment at year-end 2002 and 2007 in the eight
non-haven countries with more than $1 trillion of inbound investment in 2007 and
all tax havens with at least $5 billion of inbound investment. The table also presents
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figures for population and GDP in 2006, drawn from the Penn World Tables
(Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2009) and supplemented for very small countries
with data from the CIA (2009). Among the eight large countries in the top panel
of the table, inbound portfolio investment levels at year-end 2007 are of the same
order of magnitude as their GDPs, but that is not true of many of the tax havens in
the bottom panel, whose portfolio investment is well out of proportion to income or
population. For example, Luxembourg has greater inbound portfolio investment
than Japan, which has more than 250 times the population of Luxembourg; more
dramatically, the Cayman Islands has the sixth-largest portfolio capital inflow in
the world, despite having the population and income of a medium-sized American
city. Volumes of portfolio investment in these and other tax havens have grown
substantially, more than tripling between 2002 and 2007. Of course, these figures
represent gross rather than net capital inflows, and almost all of this inbound capital
was subsequently invested elsewhere; but by any measure, tax havens process large
volumes of capital transactions.
As locations for purely pass-through financial entities, tax havens are hard to
beat. Financial flows through tax havens are typically not subject to local taxes,
which means that certain kinds of tax obligations—such as stamp taxes, capital gains
taxes, and withholding taxes—can be avoided or deferred. Tax havens are loath to
impose currency restrictions or capital controls on international flows. Financial
companies in tax havens are often easier and less expensive to establish than are
intermediaries elsewhere, with lower filing and annual registration fees, and fewer
regulatory constraints on financing and corporate organization. Furthermore,
there is often considerable local legal, accounting, and financial expertise available
to assist investors.
For most tax havens, nearby countries are the largest sources and destinations
of their capital flows. Table 3 presents regressions in which the dependent variables
are U.S. dollar volumes of portfolio capital flows between tax havens and non-havens.
The dependent variable in the regression reported in column one is the magnitude
of capital flows in millions of U.S. dollars at year-end 2006 into tax havens in other
countries. The “Distance” from a tax haven to another country is constructed as the
distance between the geographic centers of each country (reported by CIA, 2009)
minus an adjustment for country size.1 In the first column, the insignificant – 0.1115
coefficient reflects that tax haven GDP has little discernable effect on the magnitude
of inbound capital flows, whereas the 5.0326 coefficient indicates that (not surprisingly) the size of the economy in the source country has a large effect: a $1 billion
higher income in a country adjacent to a tax haven is associated with $5 million
greater gross investment in that haven. The – 0.3509 coefficient in the first column
indicates that nearby countries receive the most investment: 1,000 kilometers of
greater “Distance” reduces the effect of GDP by roughly 7 percent (0.3509/5.0326),

1
The adjustment for country size in calculating “Distance” treats each country as though perfectly round
in calculating an approximate distance from the country center to the border; specifically, the adjustment equals the square root of the ratio of country land area (reported by CIA, 2009) and π.
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Table 3
Tax Haven Investment and Proximity
Dependent variable: Investment (millions of dollars)

In havens

From havens

Sum between haven
and non-haven pairs

437.3752
(652.9881)
– 0.1115
(1.2932)

512.6290
(513.0470)
– 0.3641
(0.6022)

3479.5200
(2631.0560)
– 2.6231
(3.4568)

Non-Haven GDP(in billions of dollars)

5.0326
(0.4583)

7.7363
(0.4510)

17.3779
(1.5653)

Distance * Non-Haven GDP

– 0.3509
(0.0613)

– 0.5617
(0.0565)

–1.1668
(0.2067)

1,575
0.0837

1,948
0.1537

688
0.1792

Constant
Haven GDP (in billions of dollars)

Number of observations
R2

Notes: The table reports coefficients from regressions in which the dependent variable is portfolio
investment in millions of U.S. dollars at year-end 2006. The dependent variable in the regression reported
in column 1 is investment in tax havens; the dependent variable in the regression reported in column 2
is investment from tax havens to non-haven countries; and the dependent variable in the regression
reported in column 3 is the sum of investment between non-haven and tax haven pairs. GDP is measured
as billions of 2006 U.S. dollars. “Distance” to a tax haven equals distances between geographic centers of
each country, minus an adjustment for country sizes that treats each country as though perfectly round,
and equals the square root of the ratio of country land area and π. The variable “Distance * Non-Haven
GDP” is the interaction of “Distance,” in thousands of kilometers, and GDP of the non-haven country, in
billions of dollars. Standard errors are in parentheses.

thereby effectively reducing investment by that fraction. A similar pattern appears
in column 2, in which the dependent variable is the portfolio capital flow from tax
havens to non-haven countries. Tax haven GDP again has an insignificant effect
on capital flows, whereas the 7.7363 coefficient in column two indicates that adjacent countries receive an additional $7.7 million in portfolio capital flows from
tax haven neighbors for every $1 billion of their (non-haven) GDP. The estimated
– 0.5617 coefficient implies again that proximity strongly influences capital flows;
indeed it has a stronger effect on investments from tax havens to non-havens than
for capital flows from non-havens to havens. The third column reports estimated
coefficients from a regression in which the dependent variable is the total volume of
gross inbound and outbound capital flows between tax havens and non-havens, the
–1.1668 coefficient indicating that 1,000 kilometers of “Distance” is associated with
$1.2 million reduced total inbound and outbound investment for every $1 billion
of non-haven GDP.
Given the ability of portfolio capital to flow to anywhere in the world, it is
striking that proximity has such a substantial effect. Part of the explanation surely
lies in the extent to which private sector professionals, and indeed the tax havens
themselves, cater their practices, procedures, and regulations to clients from nearby
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jurisdictions, developing appropriate expertise and marketing their services through
the development of business connections. But also, the underlying IMF data are
potentially incomplete, so it is possible that the data to a certain degree reflect that
nearby transactions are more apt to be reported than are other transactions.
Tax havens are also major recipients of direct investment from high-income
countries. Direct investment is undertaken almost entirely by multinational corporations, and the most ample foreign direct investment data are reported for U.S.
investment by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA). Table 4 presents direct investment data for 2004 as reported in BEA (2008);
2004 is the most recent year for which the most comprehensive BEA data are
available. The table presents aggregate information for U.S. multinational firms
investing in each of 27 tax havens in which U.S. assets exceeded $50 million in 2004,
with the category “United Kingdom Islands, Caribbean” encompassing the Cayman
Islands, the British Virgin Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands, and Montserrat, and
the category “haven total” consisting of the 46 tax havens for which there are BEA
data. The tax havens as a group had 0.84 percent of the non-U.S. world population in 2004 and 2.30 percent of non-U.S. world GDP, reflecting their high average
incomes and the contribution of foreign investors to their economies.
The foreign activities of American firms are more concentrated in tax havens
than their economic sizes would ordinarily warrant: tax haven operations had
6.06 percent of the foreign employee compensation (and 5.55 percent of foreign
employment) of U.S. firms in 2004. Tax havens similarly had 6.49 percent of the
foreign property, plant, and equipment of American firms in 2004. These patterns
reflect the attractiveness of putting income-earning activities in such low-tax jurisdictions and the somewhat greater capital intensity of operations that should be
expected in an environment in which profits, which are largely returns to capital,
are lightly taxed. The BEA data do not include information on the location of intangible assets, such as intellectual property, but if they did, they would surely show that
ownership of such assets is also strongly concentrated in tax havens. Among the tax
havens, employment together with property, plant, and equipment is concentrated
in the larger jurisdictions of Hong Kong, Ireland, Singapore, and Switzerland.
The financial operations of American firms in tax havens are also reflected in
the numbers in Table 4. American multinational firms locate 27 percent of their
foreign gross assets in tax havens, despite the relatively small sizes of these economies, and report that 42 percent of their foreign incomes are earned in tax havens.
The income figure can be easily misinterpreted to suggest that American firms
misreport their foreign earnings, as it seems incongruous that operations with
only 6 percent of foreign employment or property, plant, and equipment could
account for 42 percent of foreign income. However, most of the income reported
in tax havens arises because multinational firms commonly use tax haven affiliates
as conduits for investment in other foreign affiliates; for example, an investment
from the United States to France might be routed through Luxembourg to avoid
certain French taxes. When the French affiliate remits some of its foreign profits
in the form of interest and dividend payments, the income is first received by the
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Table 4
U.S. Direct Investment in Tax Havens, 2004

GDP

Total assets

Country
Aruba
Bahamas
Bahrain
Barbados
Belize
Bermuda
Costa Rica
Cyprus
Hong Kong
Ireland
Jordan
Lebanon
Liberia
Liechtenstein
Luxembourg
Malta
Marshall Islands
Mauritius
Netherland Antilles
Panama
Singapore
St. Lucia
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Islands, Caribbean
Haven total
All countries
(U.S. not included)
Haven percent

Net PPE

Net
income

Sales

Value
Employee
added compensation

In millions of dollars
2,139
7,512
15,725
6,307
2,525
2,909
40,685
17,500
245,455
145,882
26,649
29,462
993
2,474
31,640
7,422
423
21,618
2,883
23,441
159,251
1,773
258,934
3,170

2,344
16,701
246
19,659
151
455,281
7,565
1,065
165,598
345,052
206
465
2,644
1,153
519,147
1,310
2,485
3,190
60,167
6,890
138,284
77
317,023
284,563

714
719
17
235
20
4,712
831
42
5,412
13,751
61
17
613
2
1,213
53
1,232
31
28
1,213
9,996
18
6,825
2,051

(D)
4,069
773
3,944
147
47,878
3,478
702
63,534
134,379
148
204
2,520
341
12,409
129
835
402
549
3,410
133,944
56
135,897
20,004

(D)
495
20
2,221
5
28,492
406
55
6,854
39,266
9
13
260
2
42,540
94
437
–272
12,340
495
15,076
14
26,041
13,973

430
359
71
1,856
44
5,700
987
219
7,977
35,957
35
31
419
46
952
44
526
50
–8
585
14,229
21
17,096
1,814

88
72
36
30
5
218
403
23
3,760
4,569
21
15
115
12
575
20
66
9
10
238
3,709
4
5,681
423

1,056,772

2,351,266

49,806

569,752

188,836

89,440

20,102

45,983,540

8,688,553

766,865 3,312,531

450,760 818,256

331,593

2.30%

27.06%

6.49%

41.89%

6.06%

17.20%

10.93%

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (2008).
Notes: The table presents data reported by BEA (2008) on U.S. direct investment in the 27 tax haven
countries in 2004 with assets of at least $50 million (“U.K. Islands, Caribbean” includes the Cayman
Islands, the British Virgin Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands, and Montserrat); “Haven total” includes all
46 countries for which BEA data are available. Table entries are aggregates for all U.S. investment in each
country. Total assets are total gross assets; Net PPE is the book value of property, plant, and equipment.
Entries that are deleted to preserve survey respondent confidentiality are denoted (D).

Luxembourg affiliate, which then pays it to the American parent company in the
form of a dividend. Hence, a sizable fraction of the income reported in tax havens
is in fact income earned by other foreign affiliates that American parents invest in
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indirectly through tax haven operations. This is reflected in the sizable difference
between the tax haven share of the foreign net income (42 percent) and value
added (11 percent) of American multinational firms. Value added equals sales
minus purchases from other firms, thereby excluding financial income, and the
much smaller contribution of tax haven affiliates to total value added reflects that
tax haven affiliates are used as intermediaries. The effect of financial ownership is
also evident in the figures for affiliates located in the financial centers of Barbados,
Bermuda, Luxembourg, the Netherlands Antilles, and the Caribbean U.K. Islands,
which together report financial and nonfinancial income of $99.6 billion, or
22 percent of the total income of American foreign affiliates in 2004, along with
employment expenses of just $1.256 billion, representing 0.38 percent of the total
foreign employee compensation of American affiliates that year.
Several patterns are evident from the data in Table 4. Tax havens attract significantly greater U.S. direct investment and employment than their small economic
sizes would ordinarily merit, though they nonetheless account for a modest share of
the total foreign operations of U.S. companies. American operations in tax havens
are reported to be extremely profitable, though on closer examination most of this
unusual profitability is illusory, reflecting financial income from assets held in other
countries through tax haven affiliates. It is clear that significant amounts of capital
flow through business operations in tax havens.

Concerns and Reactions
Capital flows to tax havens raise two types of concerns: first, that reported flows
are so large; and second, that the reported flows are not large enough, in that some
investment goes unreported. The first concern is that capital flowing through tax
havens thereby avoids regulation or taxation by other countries. Indeed, the use of
tax haven locations by portfolio investors or multinational firms is in many cases
motivated in part by the ability to structure transactions in a way that is not subject
to local taxation. This reduction in taxes can be achieved in several ways.
In the case of multinational firms, a common use of tax haven intermediaries
is to permit foreign direct investment to be financed with greater amounts of debt
rather than equity, in order to benefit from the tax deductibility of interest payments.
Thus, for example, an American firm investing in its wholly-owned affiliate in a
high-tax foreign location (such as Japan) might first invest the funds in a tax haven
affiliate, which then invests only a small portion of the funds in equity in the Japanese
affiliate and loans the rest to the Japanese affiliate. The benefit of this arrangement
is that the Japanese affiliate thereby pays interest from Japan to the tax haven; the
interest payments are deductible against taxable income in Japan and are taxable
(in principle) in the tax haven, though since the tax haven may have a tax rate of
zero this is relatively unimportant. Properly structured, this arrangement need not
trigger U.S. taxes at the time of interest payments, though the United States taxes
the foreign incomes of American corporations when returned to the United States,
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so some U.S. taxes will be due on this income when ultimately remitted from the tax
haven affiliate to the U.S. parent company.
In this example, the ability to structure transactions reduces Japanese tax
obligations and increases the attractiveness of investing in high-tax Japan. From
the standpoint of Japan, this is problematic to the extent that firms finance their
investments with excessive debt; though Japan along with most other countries
(including the United States) imposes taxes on cross-border interest flows and also
limits the ability of foreign investors to deduct interest payments to related parties.
Consequently, Japan has the ability to reduce the benefits of investments structured
through tax havens if it is concerned about the use of tax haven intermediaries.
From the standpoint of the United States, it is generally beneficial for American
taxpayers to avoid foreign taxes, since doing so improves their after-tax rates of
return and facilitates U.S. tax collections. The United States taxes the repatriated
foreign incomes of American companies but grants credits for foreign taxes paid,
thereby effectively taxing U.S. firms on the difference between the U.S. and foreign
tax rates. Lower foreign tax rates entail smaller credits for foreign taxes and greater
ultimate U.S. tax collections (Hines and Rice, 1994). Dyreng and Lindsey (2009)
offer evidence that U.S. firms with foreign affiliates in certain tax havens pay lower
foreign taxes and higher U.S. taxes than do otherwise-similar large U.S. companies. A countervailing consideration is that the use of tax haven structures to avoid
foreign taxes might make foreign investment too attractive to American firms, and
thereby reduce investment in the United States.
A more aggressive form of tax avoidance is available to business taxpayers
who adjust the prices used for intercompany transactions in order to exploit tax
rate differences between countries. An excessively transparent method of doing
so would be to sell a paper clip from an affiliate in a tax haven to an affiliate in a
high-tax location, charging a price of $1 million. This creates a tax deduction of
$1 million in the high-tax buying country, and taxable income of $1 million in the
tax haven, thereby reducing total taxes. To prevent such behavior, governments
have adopted arm’s length pricing rules requiring that the prices used for intercompany transactions must be the same as those that would have been chosen by
unrelated parties transacting at arm’s length. Clearly, the arm’s length pricing
standard addresses $1 million paper clips, but there is widespread concern that
the difficulty of applying the arm’s length standard to many ordinary cases—to say
nothing of complex transactions involving sophisticated financial instruments or
intangible property such as patents and trademarks—leaves ample opportunity
for tax avoidance.
There is extensive evidence that reported after-tax profit rates of multinational
firms are higher in low-tax-rate countries (for example, Desai, Foley, and Hines,
2003; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008; Clausing, 2009). This evidence is consistent with
the data in Table 4 indicating that American firms report that 10.93 percent of
their foreign value added is earned in their tax haven operations that account for
roughly 6 percent of their foreign employment and property, plant, and equipment.
This pattern is consistent with incentives to adjust transfer prices in a tax-sensitive
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manner, though this evidence must be interpreted cautiously, since it is also consistent with adept but fully legal business and tax planning.
Because tax havens have very low tax rates, they create some of the strongest
incentives for transfer price adjustment designed to reallocate taxable income away
from high-tax jurisdictions. Indeed, some advocacy groups criticize tax havens for
allegedly preventing the developing world from effectively taxing foreign investment in their countries. Christian Aid (2009), for example, argues that the transfer
pricing opportunities provided by tax havens cost developing countries $160 billion
a year in lost tax revenue, thereby being responsible for the deaths of 1,000 children
a day. While such estimates are not consistent with other statistical evidence, they
nevertheless reflect a widespread public concern about tax havens, and in particular
their effect on vulnerable developing countries.
Portfolio investment in tax havens raises somewhat different concerns.
Investments routed through tax havens generally avoid certain comparatively
minor taxes on gross transactions, such as stamp duties and withholding taxes
on cross-border flows, but on the whole, taxpayers are generally unable to defer
home-country tax liabilities on foreign portfolio investment. As a result, there is
little, if any, incentive for investors living in high-tax countries to earn portfolio
income in low-tax foreign jurisdictions, as such income is immediately taxed by
their home governments.
With regard to portfolio investment, the primary concerns are that it can be
difficult for governments to monitor and regulate foreign portfolio investments,
and that individuals can hide money in anonymous accounts set up in tax havens.
Tax havens are the locations of choice for anonymous accounts, so the thinking
goes, both because they collect little or no tax on investment returns and because
many have traditions of protecting investor privacy. Recent revelations of significant
numbers of European individuals with unreported Liechtenstein bank accounts
and American individuals with unreported Swiss bank accounts contribute to these
concerns. Some advocacy groups like Oxfam (2000) argue that the ability to hide
funds in anonymous tax haven accounts contributes particularly to the problems
of developing countries, whose corrupt leaders, they argue, make extensive use of
such accounts.
The international reaction to tax havens has focused on the OECD, which in
1998 introduced what was then known as its Harmful Tax Competition initiative
(OECD, 1998), and is now known as its Harmful Tax Practices initiative. The purpose
of the initiative was to discourage both OECD member countries and certain tax
havens outside the OECD from pursuing policies that were thought to harm other
countries by unfairly eroding tax bases. In particular, the OECD criticized the use
of preferential tax regimes that included very low tax rates, the absence of effective information exchange with other countries, and “ring-fencing” (meaning that
foreign investors were entitled to tax benefits that domestic residents were denied).
The OECD identified 47 such preferential regimes, in different industries and lines
of business, among OECD countries, most of which have been subsequently abolished or changed to meet OECD objections.
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As part of its Harmful Tax Practices initiative, the OECD also produced a List of
Un-Cooperative Tax Havens, identifying countries that have not committed to sufficient exchange of information with tax authorities in other countries. The concern
was that the absence of information exchange might impede the ability of OECD
members (and other countries) to tax their resident individuals and corporations
on income or assets hidden in foreign tax havens. As a result of the OECD initiative,
along with diplomatic and other actions of the G-7, G-20, and individual nations,
all 38 countries and jurisdictions identified by the OECD, along with others, have
committed to improve the transparency of their tax systems and to facilitate information exchange with tax treaties and tax information exchange agreements. While
it remains to be seen just how effective some of these changes are in practice, the
secrecy that was once a feature of certain offshore accounts will clearly be much
more difficult to obtain in the future.

Tax Havens and Financial Market Competition
Financial industries in tax havens compete with financial operations elsewhere.
The financial sectors of economies in much of the world are tightly controlled by
small numbers of firms and by governments, either through regulated monopolies
or, most commonly, through state ownership of banks (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
and Shleifer, 2002), quite apart from the government takeovers that followed the
crash of 2008. This pattern particularly characterizes low-income countries and
those lacking strong democratic institutions, where government ownership of the
banking sector is the norm and where there is pervasive cronyism in the allocation
of credit. The resulting absence of competition in credit markets can be expected
to raise interest rates charged to consumers and businesses, and encourage credit
rationing in which certain borrowers are effectively unable to obtain credit at any
feasible price. Furthermore, absence of competition in banking is likely to influence the entire financial sector. As La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002)
document, countries with monopolized banking sectors, and accompanying
underdeveloped financial sectors, exhibit slow rates of productivity growth and low
per capita incomes.
Financial firms located in nearby tax havens have the potential to address some
of the problems associated with uncompetitive financial sectors by providing competition. Rose and Spiegel (2007) document that commercial banks in countries close
to tax havens have lower interest rate spreads (that is, lower differences between
the borrowing rates banks charge and the rates that depositors are paid) than do
other countries, which is a reliable indicator of greater banking competition. Their
estimates indicate that, controlling for other observable factors, doubling a country’s distance from the nearest tax haven is associated with interest rate spreads
that are 1.63 percentage points larger (for example, an interest rate spread of
5.63 percent rather than a spread of 4.00 percent). Other variables offer similar
evidence of the effect of tax haven proximity on financial market competition. The
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banking sectors of countries located closer to tax havens are less concentrated than
the banking sectors of other countries, in that the share of the market controlled
by the five largest banks is smaller and the total number of banks divided by GDP is
greater. Doubling a country’s distance from the nearest tax haven is associated with
a 6.91 percent greater share of the country’s banking sector controlled by the five
largest commercial banks. This along with the larger total number of commercial
banks in countries close to tax havens may reflect the difficulty of monopolizing a
domestic banking sector when investors have alternatives nearby.
The market competition associated with proximity to tax havens has observable
effects on the financial sectors of affected countries. Rose and Spiegel (2007) report
that, compared to other countries, the private financial markets of economies with
nearby tax havens extend more credit to their private sectors; have greater aggregate market borrowing; and have higher levels of M2, a monetary aggregate that is
partly the product of intermediation by the banking sector. All of these measures
are consistent with high levels of private-sector financial activity.
Evidence of an association between financial market competition and proximity
to a tax haven is open to multiple possible interpretations; after all, a jurisdiction
may be more likely to become a tax haven if located near other countries with welldeveloped financial markets. Alternatively, factors such as political or legal systems
common to certain regions of the world might also be associated with financial
market development. But while it is difficult to know with certainty how tax havens
affect nearby financial markets, the apparent competitive effects are consistent
with what one might expect from entry into a monopolized or quasi-monopolized
sector that otherwise charges above-market prices to consumers and businesses, that
rations capital on the basis of personal relationships, and that thereby serves as a
drag on local economies.

Tax Havens and Business Activity in High-Tax Countries
There is widespread concern that low-tax jurisdictions impose costs on other
countries in attracting investment, employment, and other business activity that
would otherwise locate in nearby high-tax areas. However, no reliable estimates
exist of the magnitude of such a diversion.
Indeed, the process may actually work the other way: that is, tax havens may
reduce the costs of entering high-tax jurisdictions in a way that promotes investment and economic activity (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2006a, b). An example is that
the use of tax haven affiliates to facilitate debt financing of investments in high-tax
Japan may encourage investment that otherwise would not locate in Japan. In addition, investors located in the United States and the few other countries that tax
active foreign business income can use tax havens to facilitate deferral of homecountry taxation of foreign income, which increases returns to foreign investments.
Finally, financial services and other intermediate goods and services obtained at
low after-tax cost in tax havens increase the productivity and competitiveness of
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economic operations in high-tax countries, thereby increasing demand for production in those locations.
In Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006b), my coauthors and I consider the effect of
tax havens on investment in high-tax countries by examining the complementary
effect of investment in high-tax countries on demand for tax haven operations.
For this purpose, we use foreign economic growth rates as instruments for foreign
investment by American firms. Thus, for example, if Italy’s economy grows at
3 percent per year and Spain’s economy grows at 1 percent per year, American firms
will tend to expand their operations more rapidly in Italy than in Spain. In this
example, some American firms start with significant Italian operations and others
with significant Spanish operations. As long as a firm’s initial distribution of foreign
investment in 1982 can be treated as random, then the subsequent differential
growth rates of their economies can be used to predict non-tax-haven investment.
These predicted growth rates are then matched to the likelihood of the same firms
creating or eliminating tax haven affiliates between 1982 and 1999. The results
indicate that greater sales or investment activity outside of tax havens is associated
with greater demand for tax haven affiliates. For the typical American multinational
firm, a 1 percent greater likelihood of establishing a tax haven affiliate is associated
with 0.5 to 0.7 percent greater sales and investment growth outside of tax havens.
The theory of the firm implies that complementarity is symmetric, so if foreign
investment makes the use of tax havens more attractive, it follows that the use of tax
havens makes foreign investment more attractive (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2006a).
A study by Blanco and Rogers (2009) draws similar conclusions from its analysis
of the effects of foreign direct investment in tax havens on foreign direct investment
in low-income countries in the same regions. Using country-level data on aggregate
foreign investment flows from 1990–2006, this study reports that investment in
developing countries is positively associated with proximity to the nearest tax haven
and to the level of foreign investment in the nearest tax haven. This evidence is a
reminder that the ability of investors to use tax haven operations need not divert
activity from nearby high-tax jurisdictions, instead suggesting that firms facing
reduced costs of establishing tax haven operations respond in part by expanding
their foreign activities in nearby high-tax countries.
There is a closely related question about the effect of foreign direct investment
on economic activity in home countries. If tax havens encourage foreign direct
investment in even high-tax foreign countries, might that not divert economic
resources that would otherwise be devoted to producing jobs and activity at home?
Put differently, how should the government of a capital-exporting country view institutions that contribute to international capital investment?
It is far from clear that greater levels of outbound foreign direct investment
come at the cost of economic activity at home, since there are countervailing substitution and productivity effects. Substitution reflects that output can be produced
either at home or abroad, so for a fixed total output, any additional foreign production then necessarily reduces domestic production, and foreign investment comes
at the cost of domestic investment. The productivity effect reflects that increases
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in foreign investment have the potential to raise the return to domestic production, stimulating demand for domestic activity and domestic output. Firms might,
for example, find that foreign operations provide valuable intermediate inputs at
low cost or that foreign affiliates serve as ready buyers of tangible and intangible
property produced at home. In either of these cases, the ability to exploit foreign
opportunities increases total demand for domestic factors of production.
Several recent studies suggest that greater outbound foreign direct investment
may not reduce the size of the domestic capital stock, and more likely increases it.
This conclusion emerges from time-series evidence of the behavior of U.S. multinational firms (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2005); aggregate evidence for Australia
(Faeth, 2006); industry-level studies of Germany (Arndt, Buch, and Schnitzer,
2007) and Canada (Hejazi and Pauly, 2003); and firm-level evidence for the United
States (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2009), the United Kingdom (Simpson, 2008), and
Germany (Kleinert and Toubal, 2007). The difficulty confronting all of these studies
is that foreign investment reflects economic conditions that very likely also directly
influence domestic investment, making it difficult to identify the pure effect of
greater foreign investment on domestic economic activity.
Detailed firm-level evidence indicates significant causal effects of foreign investment on domestic activity. In Desai, Foley, and Hines (2009), my coauthors and I
evaluate the extent to which increased foreign activity by U.S. manufacturing firms
influenced their domestic activities between 1982 and 2004. We construct firm-specific
foreign GDP growth measures, which can be used to generate predicted growth rates
of foreign activity that are then used to explain changes in domestic activity. This
empirical procedure effectively compares two U.S. firms, one whose foreign investments in 1982 were, for example, concentrated in Britain, and another whose foreign
investments were concentrated in France. As the British economy subsequently grew
more rapidly than the French economy, the firm with British operations should
exhibit more rapid growth of foreign investment than would the firm with French
operations. If the domestic activities of the U.S. firm with British operations grow at
different rates than the domestic activities of a similar U.S. firm with French operations, it may then be appropriate to interpret the difference as reflecting that foreign
business expansions stimulate greater business activity at home.
Foreign economic growth rates are strong predictors of subsequent foreign
investment by U.S. firms, which can then be compared to changes in domestic activity.
The estimates reported in Desai, Foley, and Hines (2009) imply that 10 percent
greater foreign capital investment triggers 2.6 percent additional domestic capital
investment, and that 10 percent greater foreign employee compensation is associated with 3.7 percent greater domestic employee compensation. There are similar
positive relationships between foreign and domestic changes in assets, and numbers
of employees. Furthermore, 10 percent greater predicted foreign sales growth is
associated with 6.5 percent greater exports to foreign affiliates and 5 percent higher
domestic R&D expenditures. These estimated relationships suggest that firms
combine home production with foreign production to generate final output at
lower cost than would be possible with production in just one country, making each
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stage of the production process more profitable and therefore more abundant.
Hence the simple substitution story, in which firms have fixed investment stocks
that can go either to one place or to another, is inconsistent with this evidence. As
a result, it may well be that tax havens facilitate foreign investment—and thereby
indirectly also stimulate economic activity in capital exporting countries.

Tax Haven Governance
The central characteristics of countries that become tax havens are by now
well understood: tax havens are small, typically below one million in population,
and are generally more affluent than other countries. In addition, new evidence
(Dharmapala and Hines, 2009) shows that tax havens score very well on the World
Bank’s cross-country measures of governance quality that include measures of voice
and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, rule of law, and
control of corruption. These World Bank governance quality measures are reported
by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005), who compile 352 different underlying
governance-related variables reported in 37 different data sets collected by international organizations, private firms, nonprofits, and universities.
This evidence indicates that there are almost no poorly governed tax havens.
In part, this reflects that tax havens have above-average incomes, which tend not
to be associated with poor governance. Furthermore, small countries may display
different political patterns than other countries. But even after controlling for
these factors, tax havens score highly on World Bank governance measures. In
Dharmapala and Hines (2009), in regressions controlling for other observable
variables including income, population, and aspects of geography, my coauthor
and I find a large effect of good governance on the likelihood of becoming a
tax haven: improving the quality of governance from the level of Brazil’s to the
level of Portugal’s raises the likelihood of a small country being a tax haven from
26 percent to 61 percent.
Why are better-governed countries more likely than others to be tax havens?
One interpretation is that the returns to becoming a tax haven are greater for
well-governed countries: that higher foreign investment flows, and the economic
benefits that accompany them, are more likely to materialize for well-governed tax
havens than they would for poorly-governed countries that attempt to set themselves up as financial centers. In this interpretation, poorly governed countries
do not forego potential economic benefits in not becoming tax havens, since few
benefits would flow to them if they did. Evidence from the behavior of American
firms is consistent with this explanation in that among poorly governed countries low tax rates do not prompt very much additional U.S. investment, whereas
among well-governed countries there is a significant investment effect of lower tax
rates (Dharmapala and Hines, 2009).
This interpretation of the evidence is not the only one possible; for example,
perhaps the financial activity of tax haven economies, and resulting affluence,
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improves local governance by encouraging media outlets, keeping citizens informed,
and rewarding high-quality public service with the returns that can be earned in a
market economy upon leaving government. Either way, having high-quality governance institutions and effective public servants is closely connected to effective
operation as a tax haven.
The evidence that tax havens tend to be well-governed may seem inconsistent
with the reputation of tax havens as locations in which investors can readily hide
assets in order to launder funds, evade taxes, or avoid other financial commitments.
As Sharman points out in this issue, anonymous corporations and bank accounts
located in tax havens or elsewhere can be used for all sorts of purposes, including
money laundering and tax evasion. Sharman approached corporate service providers
in 22 different countries about the possibility of creating shell corporations, for
which, in those cases in which anonymous companies were successfully established,
he also attempted to create anonymous bank accounts. He was unable to establish
anonymous corporations using corporate service providers located in commonly
identified tax havens including the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman
Islands, Dominica, Nauru, Panama, and the Seychelles. By contrast, corporate service
providers in countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, and
Canada proved more helpful to his enterprise. He readily established anonymous
corporations using these providers, with those in the United States distinguished by
the ease with which they accommodated his request to create the corporations and set
up bank accounts with unverifiable personal information.
The adherence of tax haven corporate service providers to established norms
of documentation and transparency in the creation of corporations and bank
accounts may have many sources, including the efforts of the OECD (recounted
in Sharman, 2006) and various national governments. This, together with national
aspirations and ability to wield effective government power with transparent democratic governance, may conspire to make tax havens more effective at enforcement
and thereby much less attractive locations for money laundering and tax evasion
than some of their larger brethren. Financial transparency has many attractive
features—for example, it indirectly reduces opportunities for domestic and foreign
corruption by making it difficult to hide the proceeds of bribery. Consequently,
it may not be surprising that good governance and financial scrupulousness are
associated among tax havens.

Tax Policies and Tax Competition
Countries eager to attract foreign investment might compete with each other
by reducing tax rates, as a result of which taxes, and therefore government expenditures, could be driven to inefficiently low levels. To the extent that tax havens
contribute to this tax competition, either by offering investors low tax rates or by
making investment more mobile, they might be responsible for some of the problems associated with excessive tax competition (Slemrod and Wilson, 2009). The
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likelihood of such an outcome depends on the tax policies available to governments
and the nature of the competitive environment.
It is noteworthy that international tax competition may also produce outcomes
in which capital taxes are higher than they would be in the absence of competition.
This can happen when there is foreign ownership of productive factors or when
multiple governments attempt to tax the same income sources (Hines, 2006).
The case of foreign ownership is perhaps easiest to understand: governments
that care only about the welfare of domestic residents have incentives to adopt
policies that enrich residents at the expense of foreigners. Foreign ownership of
local firms may encourage governments to raise local capital tax rates above the
levels they would impose in the absence of economic openness because much of the
tax burden is borne by foreign owners. Even foreign ownership of local land may
trigger higher corporate tax rates if the burden of corporate taxes is in part borne
by landowners in the form of lower property prices. If all governments respond to
these incentives, then capital will be overtaxed by everyone.
The integration of world economies can contribute to the incentive that countries face to tax business income too heavily. Integrated business production may
entail many stages in several different countries, all of which contribute to final
output. In such a setting, taxes on one stage of production impose burdens on all
the others by reducing the after-tax returns earned from producing final output.
Taxpayers can avoid these taxes, but at a cost; and one method of avoidance is to
scale back on production everywhere. As noted by Keen (1998) and others, the
vertical nature of production in several countries gives incentives to impose taxes
for which significant parts of the burdens are borne by other taxing jurisdictions—
which leads to overtaxation.
Tax havens figure prominently in current debates over the scope and consequences of tax competition. Tax havens are widely believed to accelerate the process
of tax competition between governments. However, a more likely possibility is that
the tax avoidance opportunities presented by tax havens allow other countries to
maintain high capital tax rates without suffering dramatic reductions in foreign
direct investment. Hence, the widespread use of tax havens may retard what would
otherwise be aggressive competition between other countries to reduce taxes in
order to attract and maintain investment. In effect, what tax havens do is to permit
governments to distinguish investments, subjecting relatively immobile domestic
investment to higher tax rates than the highly mobile international investment.
Keen (2001) and Hong and Smart (2007) identify the wide set of conditions in
which countries benefit from differentiating tax systems in this way and the effect of
such differentiation in improving the outcomes of tax competition.
Whatever incentives there may be to compete over tax rates, the tax burden on
corporate income in OECD countries has fallen little, if at all, over the past 25 years
(Griffith and Klemm, 2004; Hines, 2006). Corporate tax rates have fallen, but these
declines have been at least matched by expansions in corporate tax bases. The use
of tax havens by foreign investors helps to explain this evidence, as high-tax countries are able to maintain high-tax rates on domestic investment while continuing
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Table 5
Tax Havens and Economic Growth, 1992–2006
Group of countries

Growth rate

World
G7
OECD
Non-OECD except China

2.42%
1.75%
2.26%
2.17%

Tax havens
Non-havens

2.85%
2.39%

Countries close to tax havens (excluding tax havens)
Countries far from tax havens (excluding tax havens)

2.56%
2.14%

Source: The table presents average annual per capita real GDP growth rates
between 1992 and 2006, based on country data from the Penn World Tables,
version 6.3 (⟨http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/⟩), and supplemented, as needed,
by information from the CIA (2009).
Notes: Group averages are constructed from country data using square roots of
1992 GDP as weights. Countries close to tax havens are non-haven countries
located no more than 825 kilometers from a tax haven, with the measurement
of distance including an adjustment for country sizes. In particular, “Distance”
equals distances between geographic centers of each country minus an
adjustment for country sizes that treats each country as though perfectly
round and that equals the square root of the ratio of country land area and π.

to draw significant levels of foreign investment (Hines, 2006). The persistence of
corporate tax collections does not imply an absence of tax competition, but instead
that, in the modern financial world, competition takes a form that does not entail
reduced corporate taxation.

Tax Havens and Economic Growth
The policies of tax havens can affect their own economic fortunes and those
of other countries, possibly influencing measured national economic growth
rates—particularly during the recent period of expanded international trade and
investment, when transactions facilitated by tax havens had the greatest volume
and presumed impact. Table 5 presents information on per capita real annual
economic growth rates for various groups of countries between 1992 and 2006.
Group averages are constructed by weighting individual country growth rates by
square roots of 1992 GDP—though other weighting methods, or using population
rather than GDP weights, produce similar patterns, as does starting the growth
rate calculations in 1982.
Table 5 shows that tax havens exhibit faster economic growth rates than do
other countries. Tax havens averaged 2.85 percent annual per capita real economic
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growth from 1992 to 2006, compared to 2.39 percent for the world as a whole.
OECD countries (including the tax havens in the OECD) averaged 2.26 percent
annual per capita real growth over this period, and non-OECD countries other than
China (which is so large that it drives overall results) averaged 2.17 percent annual
per capita real growth.
The bottom panel of Table 5 distinguishes (non-haven) countries by distance
to the nearest tax haven. Ranked in order of “Distance,” the median country in the
world is 825 kilometers from the nearest tax haven, so those located closer than
825 kilometers are designated “close,” others “far.” The data indicate that countries
located closer to tax havens exhibited somewhat more rapid economic growth over
these periods than did others further away: countries located close to tax havens
had 2.56 percent average annual per capita real economic growth rates between
1992 and 2006, compared to 2.14 percent for the rest of the world. This difference
hints at the possibility that tax havens contribute to economic growth elsewhere,
though the omission of so many relevant variables and the nonrandom location
of tax havens mean that the correlation of economic growth and proximity to tax
havens must be interpreted with caution. Furthermore, the correlation of economic
growth and proximity to tax havens may mean that, conditional on there being tax
havens in the world, a country benefits from having one nearby—but that is not
quite the same as saying that the country is made better off by the existence of tax
havens. Still, this evidence is suggestive, and given the policy interest in the effect of
tax havens on developing countries, it is worth examining whether this correlation
persists when looking at a sample of developing countries and controlling for baseyear economic conditions.
Table 6 presents estimated coefficients from regressions that explain
national economic growth as a function of base-year population, per capita GDP,
and distance from tax havens and the rest of the world. The sample includes
observations for 76 countries that the United Nations Human Development
Index ⟨http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/⟩⟩ classified as having “medium” or
“low” human development, and for which data are available. The – 0.0155853
coefficient in the regression reported in column 1 indicates that, controlling for
base-year population and GDP, countries located closer to tax havens experienced
more rapid economic growth: 1,000 kilometers of additional “Distance” to the
nearest tax haven is associated with 0.016 percent slower annual per capita growth
between 1992 and 2006. Including squares of base-year log population and log
GDP as controls reduces the estimated magnitude of coefficient on tax haven
“Distance” to – 0.011707, reducing the estimated effect of 1,000 kilometers of
“Distance” to 0.012 percent slower economic growth. Some countries are located
far from tax havens because they are distant from other countries in general,
and such distance might itself affect economic growth rates, though including a
variable that measures a country’s (GDP-weighted) distance from all other countries has little effect on the estimated effect of distance to the nearest tax haven;
likewise, considering growth effects over a longer (1982–2006) time range makes
no important difference to these results.
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Table 6
Determinants of Economic Growth Rates, 1992–2006
Constant

–726.6743
(962.9270)

2,710.24
(1,900.5650)

Distance to haven
(in thousand km)

– 0.0155853
(0.0027)

– 0.011707
(0.0025)

ln Population

0.017275
(0.0035)

– 0.0596946
(0.0476)

ln GDP
(in billion $)

– 0.0100822
(0.0025)

0.0319412
(0.0360)

(ln Population)2

0.001787
(0.0013)

(ln GDP)2
Number of observations
R2

– 0.0004544
(0.0008)
76
0.8986

76
0.9243

Notes: The table reports coefficients from regressions in which the
dependent variable is a country’s annual per capita real GDP growth rate
between 1992 and 2006 in billions of 2006 U.S. dollars. Observations
consist of 76 developing countries that the United Nations Human
Development Index (⟨http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/⟩) classifies
as having “medium” or “low” human development. The coefficients are
from weighted ordinary least squares regressions in which observations
are weighted by 1992 GDP. “Distance” equals distances between
geographic centers of each country, minus an adjustment for country
sizes that treats each country as though perfectly round, and equals the
square root of the ratio of country land area (reported by CIA, 2009) and
π. “Distance to Haven” is measured in 1000s of kilometers. Population
and GDP are 1992 values. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Conclusion
Tax havens are successful players in the world economy. They draw large
amounts of foreign investment; their per capita incomes and rates of economic
growth exceed world averages; and they have well-functioning democratic
governments. Despite low tax rates, the public sectors of tax havens appear to be
well-funded, accounting for roughly 25 percent of GDP, a fraction that exceeds the
world average, albeit lying somewhat below those of the most affluent countries
(Hines, 2005).
Does tax haven affluence come at the expense of the rest of the world? The low
tax rates available in tax havens can encourage tax avoidance by multinational firms
that structure their transactions to reduce taxable incomes in the highest tax jurisdictions, and create incentives for others to funnel portfolio capital flows through
tax haven financial affiliates and thereby sidestep local taxes and regulations. In
public discussions, tax havens are commonly associated with banking secrecy and
the ability of individuals and firms to hide their money abroad, though the evidence
indicates that this may be largely a pattern of the past.
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If tax policy and financial regulation in the rest of the world were ideal, then
there would be little scope for the policies of tax havens to improve matters elsewhere and greater reason to be concerned about their possible effect. In fact, few
countries can lay claim to having perfectly designed taxes or regulations, so the
relevant question is the effect of tax havens in the world in which we live. The
evidence indicates that tax havens contribute to financial market competition,
encourage investment in high-tax countries, and may ultimately, in their little island
ways, promote economic growth elsewhere in the world.
I thank David Autor, Kathryn Dominguez, Charles Jones, John List, and Timothy Taylor
for extremely helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts, and Daniel Schaffa for
outstanding research assistance.
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